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et al.: Stanley v. Illinois

RECENT DECISIONS
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL L w-Custody proceedings-due process-equal

protection-unwed father is entitled to a hearing as to his fitness as
a parent. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Illegitimacy has been a basis for discriminatory treatment throughout legal history. The common law termed the illegitimate filius
nullius, or the child of nobody.' This curious legal fiction (and biological impossibility) originally related to inheritance rights, but was
later expanded so as to disavow any cognizable legal relationship
between the male parent and his bastard child. 2 While the natural
mother, if she is a suitable person, has generally been regarded as the
proper guardian of her illegitimate child,8 the unwed father has not
enjoyed a position equal to that of the mother. The so-called "putative" father 4 has been denied equal custodial rights and has often
been forced to proceed under a legal presumption of his unfitness as
a parent.5 In Stanley v. Illinois,6 the United States Supreme Court, in
one of its rare incursions into the nether regions of family law, declared this discriminatory treatment of the unwed father to be an
unconstitutional denial of due process and equal protection under
the law.
The petitioner, Peter Stanley, Sr., had lived with Joan Stanley
intermittently for eighteen years. During this period the petitioner
fathered three children by her. Shortly after Joan Stanley died, the
petitioner placed two of the children with Mr. and Mrs. Ness, his
7
close friends.
On May 6, 1969, the children, Peter, Jr., age 2 , and Kimberly,
age 6 months, were adjudicated dependent children by, and wards
1. W. BLACgsroNE, COMmENTARIEs 454-60 (7th ed. 1775); 16 COLum. L. REv. 698 (1916).
2. W. HooPER, THE LAW oF ILixrrrmnrcy 27 (1911).
3. See note 26, infra.
4. The term "putative father" is used countless times by courts and legal writers to
refer to the unwed father. It is an unsatisfactory term when it is applied to unwed
fathers who have acknowledged their paternity. The term infers doubt as to who the
father really is, thus stigmatizing the unwed father-bastard child relationship: "certainly to an illegitimate child, the father is never putative." Commonwealth v. Rozanski,
206 Pa. Super. 397, 399, 213 A.2d 155, 157 (1965).
5. See notes 29-32, infra.
6. 405 US. 645 (argued October 19, 1971, decided April 3, 1972).
7. The oldest child, Karen Stanley, age 17, had previously been adjudicated a neglected child while Joan Stanley was still living. Karen was not involved in the instant
proceeding. Petitioner's Brief at 11.
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of, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Juvenile Division.8 The
circuit court then awarded custody of the children to the Nesses.
No hearing was ever held to examine the petitioner's fitness as a
parent.
The Illinois statutory scheme provided alternate methods by
which the parent of a non-delinquent child could lose custody. Either
the child could be declared a ward of the State because there was no
surviving parent or guardian, 9 or the child could be adjudicated a
neglected child and removed from its parent(s) pursuant to a neglect
proceeding.10 Since there had been no showing of neglect in regard
to the Stanley children, the Cook County officials proceeded under
the theory that the children had no surviving parent.
This position was buttressed by the statutory definition of the
term "parents" in Illinois: "'Parents' means the father and mother
of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother
of an illegitimate child. . . ."11 Thus, upon Joan Stanley's death,
Peter, Jr. and Kimberly became dependent minors, i.e., children
"under 18 years of age... without a parent.. . ." 1 2-without regard
to the existence of the petitioner.
Stanley challenged the constitutionality of the custody proceedings, appealing the circuit court's order to the Supreme Court of
Illinois. Affirming, that court held that the statutory distinction between unwed mothers, treated as a class, and unwed fathers, was
"rationally related to the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act.. ." and
not violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorariin order
to review the Illinois presumption that all unwed fathers were unfit
to care for their illegitimate children. 14
At the outset, the Court rejected the State's contention that it
was not necessary for the Court to review the propriety of the dependency proceedings. In urging that such a review was unnecessary,
the State argued that since Stanley could still possibly regain custody
of the children through adoption or guardianship any harm which
had been done might still be undone.

The Court responded to this argument in two ways. First, it re8. In re Stanley, 45 Ill.
2d 182, 256 N.E.2d 814 (1970), revd sub nom. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9. IL. RE:v. STAT. ch. 87, sec. 702-1, 702-5 (1969).
10. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 87, sec. 702-1, 702-4 (1969).
11. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 87, sec. 701-14 (1969).
12. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 87, se. 702-5(1)(a) (1969).
18. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 182, 188, 256 N.E2d 814, 815 (1970).
14. 400 U.S. 1020 (1970).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol1/iss1/19

2

et al.: Stanley v. Illinois

Recent Decisions
affirmed its prior holding in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay
giew,15 refusing to concede "that a wrong may be done if it can be
undone."'16 On this point the Court held that, at the very least, the
"delay between the doing and the undoing" causes the petitioner
7
and his children to suffer.'
Second, the Court found that the Illinois law worked a hardship
on Stanley, treating him "not as a parent but as a stranger to
his children... ,"s forcing him to compete with others for custody.
In the adoption or custody proceedings which the State argued were
the proper remedy for Stanley's complaints, Stanley would have had
the burden of demonstrating not only that he was a suitable person,
but that he was the most suitable person to be the guardian of his
children. Stanley would also have had to overcome a presumption
that he was an unfit person by reason of his status as an unwed
father. Moreover, Stanley, even if successful, would be considered
only a legal guardian, not a natural parent. The Court said that
"legal custody is not parenthood,"' 19 thereby acknowledging that
Stanley, as a legal guardian, would possess only limited, court-super,
vised rights to the custody and control of his own children.
Going on to examine the hearing procedure, the Court found that
the blanket statutory refusal to consider the unwed father's fitness as
a parent was a denial of due process of law violative of the fourteenth
amendment. Illinois attempted to defend its procedures on the ground
that they resulted in expeditious placement of the child in its hopefully permanent surroundings. The Court, however, found that the
Constitution "recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency" and
that the due process clause was "designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy"; 20 thus, the constitutional guarantees outweigh the advantages inherent in speedy placement of the children. Indeed, a
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

16. 405 U.S. at 647.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 648.
19. Id. Mr. Stanley's motives for seeking the custody of his children were not that

dear. While the majority opinion held that Stanley should have been given a hearing
before his children were taken from him, he had, in fact, already voluntarily surrendered their custody to the Nesses. The majority opinion insinuates that the children
were unwillingly dragged from Stanley's home by the county officials. Only the Burger
dissent made the observation that the companionship and society of his children were
perhaps not Stanley's primary desire. It appears that Stanley may have been more concerned with the welfare assistance he would have received for his children than with a
legally enforceable obligation to care for and support them.
20. Id. at 656.
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procedure which "forecloses the determinative issues of competence
and care" endangers the interests of parent and child. 21
The Court did not treat Stanley's failure to wed the mother of his
children as sufficient justification for legislative discrimination
against him as a father. Citing its prior decision in Levy v. Louisiana,22 the Court again pointed out that discrimination on the basis
of illegitimacy is based upon purely arbitrary legal definitions rather
than upon true biological relationships. The Court found the latter
far more persuasive than the former, holding that the Illinois distinction between unwed fathers and other parents was in derogation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Since
married and divorced parents, as well as unwed mothers, have a
right to a custody hearing in Illinois, equal protection requires that
a hearing also be provided for unwed fathers. The Court did not
choose to elaborate on its equal protection findings. It simply indicated that the conclusion was inescapable.2
Mr. Justice White wrote for the majority, joined by Justices
Brennan, Stewart and Marshall. (Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the
due process findings of Parts I and II of the opinion.) For the dissenters, Chief Justice Burger first argued that the Court should not
have dealt with the due process question at all.2 4 The Burger dissent
then agreed with the State's argument that its custody procedures
did not violate the equal protection clause. In the dissenters' view, it
was reasonable to discriminate against Stanley, as an unwed father,
because he did not seek the correlative burdens which must accompany custody-namely, a legally enforceable obligation to support his
children.25
It is generally agreed that the natural mother of an illegitimate
child, if she is a suitable person, is the proper guardian of her child.2 0
21. Id. at 657.
22. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
23. 405 U.S. at 658.
24. No due process argument was raised by Stanley in the courts below. The Chief
Justice contended that the issue was improperly raised by the Court: "Stanley will undoubtedly be surprised to find that he has prevailed on an issue never advanced by him."
Id. at 662 (dissenting opinion).
25. As the New Mexico Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181,
184, 190 P. 1020, 1024 (1920), "[i]t would be a strange doctrine that would give to a man

the custody of a child without casting upon him the correlative duty of supporting the
child." The unwed father's support liability exists solely by virtue of statute. Under the
common law, the unwed father is under no legal obligation to support his bastard child.
See Murrell v. Industrial Commission, 291 II. 534, 126 N.E. 189 (1920); Home of the
Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965).
26. In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954); Wallace v.
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However, the legal relationship between the unwed father and his
bastard child has been a subject of confusion, inequity and ambiguity.
If the mother is found not to be a suitable guardian, or if, as in
Stanley, she is dead, courts and legislatures differ widely as to the
right of the father to have custody of his natural child. 27 The unwed
father is not considered a parent under the common law2s and he is
excluded by statute in a number of jurisdictions from the definition
of "parent." 29 Only four states-Alabama, Kansas, North Carolina
and Oregon-include an unwed father in their statutory definition of
parent in a context relevant to child custody.3 0
If the natural mother dies, the father is given a right to the
custody of his child superior to the rights of nonrelated persons
seeking custody in twelve states, by statute or court decision.31 The
majority of state statutes simply fail to mention the unwed father,3 2
and the question of his custody rights has been left to the courts to
ponder-with an unfortunate lack of uniformity. England, interestingly enough, has progressed considerably since the days of filius
Wallace, 60 I11. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 4 (Ist Dist. 1965); Timmins v. Lacy, 30 Tex. 116
(1867); Cleaver v. Johnson, 212 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); In re M, (an infant)
(1955) 2 Q.B. 479 (CA.), 51 A.L.R.3d 216, 220; 10 C.J.S. Bastards sec. 17; Comment,
Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right to Notice, 1968 U. ILL. L. FoRtmi
232; Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1071
(1966). In a recent New York case, an intermediate appellate court reversed a decision
awarding custody to the unwed father, finding that "the mother of an illegitimate child
is prima facie entitled to custody." Norcia v. Richard, 32 App. Div. 2d 656, 800 N.Y.S.2d
608 (2d Dept. 1969).
27. See In re Doe, 52 Hawaii 448, 478 P. 2d 844 (1970); Friesner v. Symonds, 46 N.J.
Eq. 521, 20 A. 257 (1890); Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190 P. 1020 (1920); Lewis v.
Crowell, 210 Ala. 199, 97 So. 691 (1923); Cleaver v. Johnson, 212 S.W.2d 197 (rex. Civ.
App. 1948); State v. Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan, 47
Wisc. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970). See also 22 SYR. L. REv. 770 (1971).
28. Wright v. Bennett, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 587 (1845).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1964); Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 74.203 (1964); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1969); N.D.
CrNT. CODE § 32-36-35 (1960); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 25-8-46 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 56-236 (1970); Wisc. STAT. § 48.02 (1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-53 (1967).
80. ALA. CODE, tit. 34, § 89 (1958); Law v. State, 288 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 109.060 (1961): In Oregon, however, this statute is contradicted by other state
statutes. See Embick, The Illegitimate Father,3 J. FAM. L. 321 (1963).
31. Aiuz. R v. STAT. ANN. § 14-846 (1956); Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167,
412 P.2d 463 (1966); In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954);
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 202 (West 1952); In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W.2d 449
(1962); In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965); Aycock v. Hampton, 84
Miss. 204, 36 So. 245 (1904); In re Guardianship of C, 98 N.J. Super. 474, 237 A.2d 652
(1967); OHio Rv. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Baldwin 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Harper
v. Fuller, 142 Pa. Super. 98, 15 A.2d 518 (1940); Templeton v. Walker, 179 S.W.2d 811
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944); In re State in Interest of M, 25 Utah 2d 201, 476 P.2d 1013
(1970); WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.24.190 (1967); State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 23
Wash. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945); Wade v. State, 39 Wash. 2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951).
32. Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 Mints. L, Rxv.
1071, 107fi (196i6),
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nullius. In 1959, England provided the unwed father with an opportunity to be heard in custody proceedings, under the Legitimacy
Act.13
The legislative and social policy behind the discriminatory treatment of the unwed fathers has been often discussed by courts and
legal writers, but seldom with concrete, supportive reasoning. It is
widely stated that the best interests of the child should be the guiding factor,3 4 and this is often the policy behind denying the unwed
father the custody of his child. Justice Traynor has stated, in In re
Guardianshipof Smith,85 that
[i]t bears emphasis.., that the father of an illegitimate child
comes before the court in at best a questionable light. Although past indiscretions do not necessarily demonstrate present unfitness [citations omitted] such a father should be
required to explain why he has not legitimated his child.
The psychological effect upon a child who is deprived of the society
of his natural father would seem relevant to his "best interests," but
unfortunately the courts do not always agree.
Courts and legal writers have considered various factors in justifying the discrimination against the unwed father. In Stanley, the
facilitation of custody proceedings and the difficulty of ascertaining
paternity were two reasons set forth by the State. It has been contended that the "number of out-of-wedlock fathers who are interested
in their children is perhaps so small that it might appear an extravagant waste of time, energy, and money,"8 6 to direct attention to the
situation where the father comes forward and wants his children. The
New Jersey Superior Court in Schmoll v. Creecy S7 considered the rationale to be a combination of the discouragement of promiscuity,
protection of the family, emphasis on the father-child relationship,
allowing the father the choice of recognizing the child.38
The Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that
[i]t would appear that because [custody] disputes.., are not
33. Legitimacy Act, 7 & 8 Ellz. 2, c. 73, § 3. See Note, The Putative Father and the
Illegitimate Child, 25 MoD. L. REV. 736 (1962).
34. See Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d 202, 165 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1957); In re
Welfare of Zink, 269 Minn. 535, 132 N.W.2d 795 (1964); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App.
122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888
(1954); KRAusE, IrLEGTmoAcY: LAw AND SOCIAL PoLicy, 28-32 (1971); AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 64 at 892.
35. 42 Cal. 2d 91, 94, 265 P.2d 888, 892 (1954).

36. Note,50 MINN. L. REV., supra note 32, at 1087.
37. 104 N.J, Super. 126, 249 A.2d 3 (1969), rev'd, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969).
38. See Krause, The BastardFinds His Father,3 FAm. L. Q. 100, 105 (1969).
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common, the right of the out-of-wedlock father to notice and
to be heard has either been overlooked or intentionally omitted. [footnote omitted] This may be explained by historical
experience from which it is assumed that the overwhelming
percentage of fathers of out-of-wedlock children are not interested in their children, in recognizing them, in supporting
them, in legitimating them, or especially in seeking their custody.3 9
In De Phillipsv. De Phillips,40 the Illinois Supreme Court denied
visitation rights to an unwed father. In a strong dissent, Chief Justice
Klingbiel urged that "[n]either the language of our statute nor any
sensible interpretation of 'policy' justifies this court in depriving a
putative father of the society of his child under any and all circumstances." 41 Professor Harry D. Krause argues that the unwed father
should have an opportunity to be heard:42
[n]o rational legislative reason justifies not hearing the interested father (especially one who contributes to the support of
his child) on issues involving the child's general welfare. ....
Professor Krause has also made the observation that discrimination in the unwed father-bastard child relationship is "found in history, not in reason." 43 This is certainly true when lawmakers begin
with the proposition that all fathers of illegitimate children are unfit
or unwilling to care for their own children, The very fact that a man
has fathered a child out-of-wedlock confers upon him a degree of abnormality. The unwed father has been termed the "illusive ghost"
in adoption proceedings.4 4 Perhaps this is just as much the result of
legislative and social discrimination as the fault of the unwed father
himself. The low level of esteem in which he is held is evidenced by
the questionable observation that "[t]he mother's immediate love for
her child seems normal; the same emotion in the unwed father suggests a neurotic tVist. '45 It may be true that a majority of unwed
fathers have no desire to gain custody of their illegitimate children.
However, to classify all unwed fathers as undesirous or undeserving
59. In re Brennan, 270 Minn.455, 461, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131 (1965).
40. 35 IM. 2d 154, 219 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
41. Id. at 159, 219 N.E2.d at 468 (dissenting opinion).
42. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: L.AW AND Soa.AL PoLicy 96 (1971).
43. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-FirstDeci-

sions on Equal Protection and Paternity,26 U. Cm. L. RLv.338,349 (1969).
44. Burgess, The Unmarried Father in Adoption Planning,15 Cmi mm 71 (Mar.-

April, 1968).
45. Id. at 73.
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of having custody of their children is a denial of due process and
equal protection under the law. The Stanley case recognizes that the
unwed father's standing as natural father should be considered favorably in custody proceedings, and that he should be given a hear-

ing as to his fitness to care for his child without being prejudiced by
his lack of marital status.
The Supreme Court's decision in Stanley can be viewed as consistent with the policy announced in Levy v. Louisiana0 and its companion case, Glona v. American Guaranteeand Liability Insurance
Co.47 These two cases have been considered to disallow all classifications based upon illegitimacy.48 As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in
Glona, "[t]o say that the test of equal protection should be the 'legal'
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the
Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to
draw such 'legal' lines as it chooses." 49 Professor Krause predicted
that "most convincingly and directly the [unwed] father's rights may
be derived from the Glona case." 5 °
In a more recent case, Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,8 1 the Supreme Court struck down another Louisiana statutory
classification based upon illegitimacy. The Court declared a portion
of the Louisiana workmen's compensation law that excluded illegitimate children from receiving benefits upon the work-related death
of their natural father to be a denial of equal protection. However,
in Labine v. Vincent,52 the Supreme Court distinguished Levy and
Glona and upheld a Louisiana intestate succession statute which restricted the illegitimate's inheritance rights. The Labine Court found
that the state had a valid interest in directing the disposition of property left within the state.5 After Stanley, the Labine case must be
viewed as a last remaining impediment to unwed parents and illegitimate children asserting their rights as equal under the law."'
46. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).

47. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
48. Gray and Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimates: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guaranteeand Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv.

1, 3 (1960).

49. 391 U.S. 73 at 75-76.
50. KRAusE, supra note 42, at 95.
51. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
52. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
53. Id. at 588.
54. A recent New York case, Holden v. Alexander, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dept. 1972),
found sections of the New York Estates, Powers and Trust Law to be unconstitutional
as applied to an illegitimate. The law required that the unved mother have entered
an order of filiation (paternity proceeding) before an illegitimate or its father could

sue under the New York Wrongful Death provisions. The Appellate Division based its
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Stanley v. Illinois may be applauded for its recognition that the
lack of a marriage license is not justification enough for legislative or
judicial discrimination against a natural father who desires the custody of his illegitimate children. Stanley, Levy, Glona and Weber
will provide future litigants who are prejudiced by a fact of birth
or by their lifestyle with a strong arsenal of the highest judicial
pronouncements to attack the constitutionality of discriminatory
laws. Sexual mores have been changing. The desirability of forming
a traditional family unit is being questioned. There are persons who
choose not to be bound by a formal marriage, but who wish to live
together and have children. Those who choose this lifestyle should
not be placed at a disadvantage under the law, especially in a situation such as Stanley where the father is the only surviving parent.
The Supreme Court previously declared that a divorced father is entitled to a hearing as to his fitness for the custody of his children.5 5
The logical extension of this situation is to provide a hearing to unwed fathers, in situations, unlike Stanley, where both parents are
alive.5 6
Mr. Stanley has been given a hearing by the Circuit Court of
Cook County as to his fitness to obtain custody of his children. There
appears to be a substantial question whether he is a proper person to
have custody. As of this writing, his case is still pending. It may be
true that Stanley's motivation is economic rather than emotional, but
sound law is not always made for the best of individuals.
decision on Levy and Glona, finding the statutory discrimination to be a denial of
equal protection. The court stated, "[t]he bond between them [father and child] could
not have been made any stronger by an order of filiation." Id. at 654.
55. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
56. The granting of substantive due process to unwed fathers will not, of course,
affect the long history of social discrimination against those who maintain "illicit" relationships. For example, a recent California proposal made by the California Social
Welfare Board would allow a third illegitimate child born to an unwed mother to be
taken away from her, on the assumption that any woman who has had three illegitimate
children is "morally depraved." N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1972, at 20, col. 3.
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